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Evolutionary computer simulations are an important part of the theoretical biologist's toolkit (Peck, 2004; 
DeAngelis & Mooij, 2005; Kokko, 2007), offering insights into a range of fundamental evolutionary 
processes, not least sexual selection (e.g. van Doorn & Weissing 2004, 2006; Fawcett et al., 2007, 2011; 
van Doorn et al., 2009; reviewed in Kuijper et al., 2012). Like all theoretical tools, they must be used with 
care (Hamblin, 2012). Smaldino & Newson (2013, henceforth S&N) have challenged our recent work on 
parent–offspring conflict over mate choice (Van den Berg et al., 2013), arguing that our simulations rely 
on unrealistic assumptions and that our conclusions are not supported. But all four points of criticism they 
present are misguided. (1) The accusation that the handicap principle cannot work in our model is wrong; 
Fig. 1a in Van den Berg et al. (2013) clearly demonstrates that a costly preference for a signal of male 
quality does evolve. (2) The assertion that mutation bias drove male quality close to zero in our model is 
wrong; in fact, male quality reached very high, stable levels in our simulations. (3) The assertion that 
overcompensation was responsible for our results is wrong; parent and offspring preferences also diverge 
in the absence of overcompensation. (4) The alternative explanation offered for our results is wrong, 
because it predicts the opposite pattern to that we actually observed in our simulations. Below we address 
each of these misunderstandings and consider two alternative hypotheses suggested by S&N. 
 
1. Relation between male signaling and mate quality 
S&N claim that, in our model, males of higher quality pay a higher cost of exhibiting the trait. This is not 
true. In our model there is no direct relation between male quality (i.e. provisioning ability) and survival 
cost; instead, a male’s survival depends solely on his expression of the indicator trait (te). But it is true 
that for the same genetic value of trait expression (t), we assumed that higher-quality males signal at 
higher intensity and hence pay higher survival costs. Based on this, S&N conclude that we have ignored 
the “well accepted common sense rule of costly signaling” that “signaling quality must incur a cost which 
only quality individuals can afford.” However, standard theory on sexual selection shows that costly 
preferences can evolve if higher-quality males produce stronger signals for the same genetic value of trait 
expression (Iwasa et al., 1991; Fawcett et al., 2007). This is the form of costly signaling we implemented 
in our model. That the handicap principle works in this case is evident from the results in Step 1 of our 
model, which is a standard sexual selection model without parental involvement: Fig. 1a in Van den Berg 
et al. (2013) shows stable exaggeration of a costly female preference for a costly indicator of male 
quality. More importantly, our findings are robust to the specific assumptions of our model; if we assume, 
as S&N recommend, that low-quality males pay higher costs of trait expression, we still predict the 
emergence of parent–offspring conflict over mate choice (Fig. 1). 
2. The evolution of male provisioning ability 
S&N criticize our assumption of a negative mutation bias on male quality. However, this is a common 
assumption in models of sexual selection with heritable male quality (Pomiankowski et al., 1991; Iwasa et 
al., 1991), including the one S&N refer to (Iwasa & Pomiankowski, 1999). It is a standard way of 
resolving the so-called ‘lek paradox’ (Kotiaho et al., 2008); without such a mechanism, male quality 
rapidly tends to fixation at the highest possible value, negating the benefits of female choosiness, which 
disappears as a result.  
It is not surprising that male provisioning ability rapidly declines to zero if a negative mutation bias is the 
only force affecting its evolution (as in S&N’s Fig. 1), but in our model this mutation bias is opposed by 
two selection pressures. First, males of higher quality have more resources to invest in their offspring, and 
therefore on average obtain higher reproductive success. Second, evolved female preferences for males 
with a larger indicator trait also favor higher-quality males. As a result, male parenting ability is 
maintained at high levels in our simulations (averages ± s.e.m. over the last generation of all replicates: 
0.940 ± 0.001 [step 1]; 0.937 ± 0.001 [step 2]; 0.899 ± 0.001 [step 3]; 0.895 ± 0.001 [step 4]) —far from a 
“negligible” contribution to child-rearing. This incorrect assertion appears to be at the root of most of the 
issues raised by S&N. Nonetheless, to address concerns about our assumptions, we have investigated a 
modified version of our model without biased mutations (Fig. 2); here, too, we predict the emergence of 
parent–offspring conflict over mate choice. 
3. Parental allocation strategies 
S&N suggest that parent-offspring conflict emerges in our model because the parents’ compensatory 
resource-allocation strategy “overcompensates (or overaugments) for disparities in mate-provided 
resources.” This is not the case; in Fig. 3 in Van den Berg et al. (2013), where allocation strategies are 
free to evolve, the onset of parent–offspring conflict already occurs before parents overcompensate (i.e., 
while the evolved value of alpha is still smaller than −1). This is confirmed by one of the modified 
versions of our model presented here (Fig. 1), in which undercompensation evolves but the conflict over 
mate choice is still strong. 
S&N speculate why evolution drives the sum of female and parental preferences (p + q) to “consistent 
values.” Their explanation rests on the presumption that in our model it is in the parents’ interest to avoid 
having daughters with very low fecundity. This is not true: parents maximize their fitness by maximizing 
the total fecundity of all of their daughters, regardless of how that fecundity is distributed over individual 
daughters. In our model, there is a persistent selection pressure on daughters to be less choosy than their 
sisters, resulting in a weakening of the female preference. Parents, in contrast, use their influence on mate 
choice to ensure that the realized preference (p + q) has the same value as it would have had in the 
absence of parental involvement, because this represents the optimal compromise for them between the 
costs and benefits of choosiness. 
4. Evolving parental compensation 
S&N suggest that our main result (Fig. 3 in Van den Berg et al., 2013) is caused by an entirely different 
mechanism than the one we put forward. However, their argument is based on misconceptions about the 
workings of our model, in particular the incorrect assertion that “the average resource contribution to 
childrearing from partnered males was negligible” (see section 2).  
Our explanation for the evolution of compensatory parental resource allocation strategies is 
straightforward: if there are diminishing returns on investment, it pays more to invest in daughters that 
have fewer resources from their partner. If, instead, returns on investment are accelerating, parents evolve 
an augmenting resource-allocation strategy (see Fig. S2 in Van den Berg et al., 2013). This latter pattern 
would not evolve if the alternative explanation proposed by S&N were correct. 
5. Comparison with other hypotheses 
S&N find it implausible that sibling competition for parental resources would be strong enough to weaken 
the female preference for high-investing mates. Yet there is overwhelming evidence in a range of other 
contexts that sibling competition is a potent evolutionary force with some striking consequences, 
including chick begging, siblicide, and genomic imprinting (Kilner & Hinde, 2012; Roulin & Dreiss, 
2012). We maintain that our model provides a potentially valid hypothesis that deserves further attention. 
 
S&N mention two alternative hypotheses for the evolution of parent-offspring conflict over mate choice. 
The first hypothesis, already alluded to by Trivers (1974), rests on the observation that a female’s mate 
often provides resources not only to their own children, but also to those of her sisters and cousins. Such 
behavior seems more beneficial to the female’s parents than to the female herself, so potentially it could 
lead to parent–offspring conflict over mate choice. This is an interesting hypothesis, but it leads to a new 
problem: why would males divert resources from their own children to less related family members? 
S&N’s second hypothesis is that parents are more experienced, and therefore better able to choose a mate 
for their offspring. This may be true, but it does not explain the conflict; why would offspring disagree if 
their parents know best? 
 
Our model (Van den Berg et al., 2013) explains, from an evolutionary point of view, why parents and 
offspring should not necessarily agree over the latter’s choice of a mate. We did not claim that it is the 
only possible explanation for this conflict, nor even the best one, and we welcome alternative hypotheses 
as well as constructive criticism of our model. To discriminate between competing hypotheses, it is 
essential to examine the logic closely and derive clear, testable predictions. Evolutionary computer 
simulations have a vital role to play in this regard. 
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Fig. 1. Parent–offspring conflict over mate choice still emerges when high-quality males pay reduced 
signaling costs. In this modified version of our model, male survival probability (vm) is dependent on the 
genetic value for signaling intensity (t) rather than the expressed trait value (te), according to 
 2expmv ct  . To achieve the same level of trait expression te, lower-quality males require a higher 
value of t (as in our original model) and therefore incur higher survival costs. Means and standard errors 
over 50 replicate simulations are shown. 
Fig. 2. Parent–offspring conflict over mate choice still emerges when male quality is not heritable (and 
therefore not subject to a negative mutation bias). In this modified version of our model, male quality is 
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 at birth. Means and standard errors over 50 
replicate simulations are shown. 
